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Introduction
The above quote gets at the very essence of the extreme importance for multinational operations as part of an overall effective U.S. military strategy. AsiaPacific is a global economic driving force that possesses the majority of great powers, nuclear weapons, and one-third of the world's population. The security challenges are piracy, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, natural resources, territorial state and sea trade disputes. Transitioning the balance of power toward Asia is vital to U.S. interests.
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Achieving the balance of power in Asia will require ally and partner nation support to achieve success. Specifically, how does the Asia-Pacific changing environment relate to Army land component (ground forces) training and readiness mutually supported by the Marines and ground forces of our multinational partners? Asia-Pacific is viewed by many leaders as a naval and air requirement for military planning to deter aggression. I agree that naval and air forces will play a larger role in any conflict in this region, however, ground forces must equally be trained to achieve overall victory. As we have seen throughout history, the inability to fight the enemy on land, hold territory, and limit enemies from sustaining naval and air forces negatively impacts the overall success in conflicts and can lead to a protracted state of affairs. Currently, the U.S. military 2 strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been referred to as "hub-n-spoke" with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand. 2 The Army has been using the "hub-nspoke" concept to sustain training and readiness in order to achieve efficiencies and 3 This paper will analyze the merits for such a capability to enhance training and readiness, build U.S. confidence, and strengthen partner capacity and alliances for emerging threats.
China's Rise
Is China a threat militarily to U.S. or its allies? The premise for the U.S. pivot to the Pacific region is underpinned by the rise and perceived threat of China. China claims they want a peaceful rise to superpower status; however China is currently on track to be the world's largest military investor over the next 20 years. Some political analysts agree that the silent rise of China is to posture itself to be able to intervene with surpassing our allies and partners in the region should be of great concern and cause question as to how we assist and help improve our multinational alliance and coalition posture.
Policy and Doctrine
The United States (U.S.) National Defense Strategy purports that we will continue to face violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with, or trying to acquire, weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers (such as China), and even more sophisticated emerging space and cyber threats. 7 These challenges not only face the U.S., but face every nation and non-nation globally. So, our U.S. political objectives, or ends, are to "Defend the Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter Conflict, and Win our Nation's Wars." 8 Given the current fiscal environment of defense budgets, increasing partnership capacity in the Asia region becomes important for sharing the costs in order to capitalize on spreading a cohesive multinational land force alliance to deter and sustain security. "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities." 9 Thus, U.S. policy has provided our ends for which the application of ways and means must be established at all levels of military planning. Recently, the Secretary of the Army released his top ten priorities and number three is, "Enhance Army activities in the Asia-Pacific region." 10 
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Multinational Operations
The paragraph above provides Commander-in-Chief 
Land Force Requirement
Since the Soviet Union and the threat of the cold war, the Army and other services have moved from focusing on conventional forces with predicted force structure to full spectrum operations; a fundamental doctrine previously followed for years when facing a potential conventional enemy of similar structure in defense as our 8 own. We have been engaged in asymmetrical combat more typical to guerrilla warfare in the Middle East for over ten years. As we look to the future, our new enemies could present a threat much like that of the soviet-union in concept and drives the need for force-on-force proficiency. 18 The personal. Land forces take the brunt of casualties and are exposed directly to chaos, death, and destruction. Soldiers can rarely engage the enemy without managing the battlefield environment that comprises both combatants and non-combatants. Ground combat operation's success is determined through competent actions and decisions during all phases of a campaign. 22 The Army uses air and naval joint integration to enhance and succeed in ground operations and it is rarely the reverse in any war. "No major conflict has ever been won without boots on the ground." 23 There are few occasions where aerial and naval bombardment influences changes in bad state actors, but these efforts never win a war without ground force presence.
The Army must prevent, shape and win our nation's wars in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment. To prevent or deter war, we must provide credible forces that leaves no doubt that we are a lethal force capable of defeating any and all enemies under any conditions. One key to providing a credible force is through rigorous multifaceted training at all levels to attain proficiency. Shaping is acquiring nation alliances and partners to help us contain mutual enemies. Building partnerships is the first step and is followed by our assistance in defending themselves through capacity building, training, and multinational exercises. Multinational operations in war are critical to prevent access denial, gain geostrategic advantages and defeat the enemy. To win, we must be able to attack and defend while conducting decisive land ground combat operations and enhance are power through synchronizing joint and multinational operations. 24 The Army fights in BCT formations at the Brigade and below level. CTCs offer the best simulated combat realism to train as we fight along multinational partners at the BCT level where the most casualties and fog of war take place. The Asia-Pacific must provide the opportunity to conduct multinational combat training to prevent, shape and win wars.
Implications of Air-Sea Battle Doctrine
To be successful in war, the U.S. must have a robust ability to deploy forces across the globe--power projection. The key contributing factor in the success of power projection is forward deployed forces and strong alliances with other nations. 25 Why is joint enablers. The priority will be for BCTs to train at home station prior to their resident CTC rotation. 37 The JPMRC program is planned to be implemented in three phases of which the last phase will provide an exportable training capability to support multinational training at the BCT level by FY18. 38 The JPMRC is not currently designed to replace U.S. Army BCT's resident CTC rotation but to complement home station training. Additionally, the JPMRC is not a dedicated mobile capability for multinational training support to our allies and partners in the region.
U.S. Force Posture Strategy
As a result of President Obama's FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 39 under section 346, a force posture strategy was mandated and published for PACOM. 40 This strategy also outlines posture for the PACOM Commander to execute capacity building for nation partners and joint and combined training to enhance interoperability for multinational coalitions. "U.S. force posture must demonstrate a readiness and capacity to fight and win, even under more challenging circumstances associated with A2/AD." 41 The Army portion of the defense budget is decreasing and fiscal challenges are a planning factor; however the posture strategy does caution that current funding may not meet mission requirements to sustain regional stability. It is advised that the U.S. must recognize that future increases in defense budgets to support the Asia-Pacific might be necessary, especially to secure potential benefits through new partnerships and stronger alliances. 42 The regional study provides over 100 pages of stationing and command relations for the region but does not address a functional or multinational training command, or the need for one such as JMTC in Europe. It does address expanding multinational exercises and transfer of the JPMRC to PACOM. I would argue that inclusion of the two sentence reference to JPMRC was upon result of the USARPAC initiative and was not part of any real in-depth findings based on the independent assessment. 43 The U.S. force posture strategy for the Asia- unit throughput capacity at the three Army CTCs. 59 The U.S. Army has been able to significantly increase multinational participation in the CTC at JRMC primarily due to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, thus allowing a dedicated CTC for joint multinational operations to support operations in the Middle East. The success of JIIM at JMRC to produce trained and synchronized multinational partners operating amongst U.S. forces has gained worldwide accolades. The future test will be the ability to maintain a robust JIIM CTC capability for force-on-force rotations coupled with the fact that no such CTC capability exists in the Asia-Pacific. The ability to provide integrated ground combat multinational proficiency in the Asia-Pacific will be just as crucial to the ongoing multinational efforts conducted at JMRC-a proven success. USARPAC's current JPMRC planning concept will not address the full attention needed for multinational partners in the Asia-Pacific; nor is it intended to be such a program. [Odierno stated] I know there is a lot of water out there in the Pacific, but they're still land-centric…the most politically influential service tends to be the Army…it requires a joint force…you can't achieve, in my opinion, A2/AD with just air and sea. If the pivot to the Asia-Pacific is a priority for the 21 st Century as stated by President Obama, have we set conditions for success in the Pacific region? Clearly USARPAC has made tremendous efforts but the focus has not been force-on-force to prepare for a conventional Army such as China. There is a continuing need to train for COE and full spectrum operations; however more emphasis must be equally placed on training for conventional forces in a joint multinational environment. The ability to build synchronized combat multinational power to combat an enemy such as China merits a forward deployed training command with a resident multinational CTC capability. The vast distance across USARPAC's area of responsibility provides a significant challenge with transportation costs for equipment associated with partnership capacity building and multinational exercises. 62 One way to reduce costs is to provide prepositioned 23 training sets from various countries at a joint multinational training center in the AsiaPacific. Movement of personnel only and light equipment to and from the joint multinational training center will significantly reduce these costs.
The U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific is primarily due to China's rise and their desires and actions to achieve economic and military super power status. This threat will not go away and the land component plays a crucial role in shaping how this threat will evolve.
The largest allocation of land forces in PACOM's AOR is provided by USARPAC and as a forward deployed presence lacks a training command organization. Additionally, with USARPAC's partner capacity building need; nothing organizationally resembles USAREUR's JMTC command and control and lacks a resident CTC capability. There is an opportunity that should be pursued to build both a joint multinational training command and a joint multinational resident CTC capability under the land domain in the Asia-Pacific. The Army has taken 58 percent of the 2013 defense budget cuts which means the Air force, Navy, and Marines have taken a 42 percent reduction collectively. 63 The FY12 NDAA and report under section 346, outlines posture for PACOM to execute capacity building for nation partners and joint and combined training to enhance interoperability for multinational coalitions. Again, this report cautioned that current funding may not meet mission requirements to sustain regional stability. 64 The joint multinational training command and joint multinational CTC initiative may convince the PACOM commander to justify additional resources that will enhance the land domains relevancy in the 21 st century in the Asia-Pacific.
Endnotes
